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Abstract
There is a widening consensus among jurisdictions with competition laws that
“the basic objective of competition policy is to protect competition as the most
appropriate means of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources—and thus effi-
cientmarket outcomes—in free market economies.” 1 As this statement indicates,
it is efficiency, not competition, that is the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws. One
of the senior economists of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division put it very
well recently: “efficiency is the goal, competition is the process.”2 When the com-
petitive process is allowed to run its course—unfettered by exclusionary practices
or anticompetitive agreements among firms—the incentive of firms to lure away
rivals’ customers by offering them lower prices, superior quality, or new prod-
uct features will necessarily lead these firms to seek more efficient ways to do
business. Only by devising more efficient means to produce and distribute their
goods, or by finding ways to offer superior or additional features for the same cost,
can firms displace sales by their competitors. Antitrust enforcement therefore as-
sumes as its mandate the deterrence of business conduct that threatens to distort
the competitive process in product and innovation markets.
THE MERGER GUIDELINES AND THE
INTEGRATION OF EFFICIENCIES INTO
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a widening consensus among jurisdictions with competition
laws that “the basic objective of competition policy is to protect competi-
tion as the most appropriate means of ensuring the efficient allocation
of resources—and thus efficient market outcomes—in free market econ-
omies.”1 As this statement indicates, it is efficiency, not competition, that
is the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws. One of the senior economists
of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division put it very well recently:
“efficiency is the goal, competition is the process.”2 When the competitive
process is allowed to run its course—unfettered by exclusionary practices
or anticompetitive agreements among firms—the incentive of firms to
lure away rivals’ customers by offering them lower prices, superior quality,
or new product features will necessarily lead these firms to seek more
* Mr. Kolasky is a Member of the District of Columbia Bar. He served as Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001
to 2002. Dr. Dick is a Principal with Charles River Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C. When
this article was written, he was Acting Chief of the Competition Policy Section in the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The authors thank Craig W. Conrath,
a Senior Litigator in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, for assistance
in drafting the sections on the 1997 revisions and the role of efficiencies in merger
review in other jurisdictions, and Constance Robinson, Director of Civil Enforcement,
and Gregory J. Werden, Senior Economic Counsel, for their very helpful comments. The
authors also thank Sheldon Kimmel, an economist at the Division, for the example in
note 134 and for calling our attention to the Hoffman v. MacMullan case in note 4. This
paper reflects the authors’ personal views only. The authors also thank Christina Akers,
Joseph Wheatley, and Gloria Jenkins for cite checking and polishing the final product,
and Gari Lister for her excellent editorial suggestions.
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Competition Policy and
Efficiency Claims in Horizontal Agreements, OECD/GD (96) 65, Paris (1996).
2 Kenneth Heyer, Address Before the Merger Task Force of the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Competition (Apr. 9, 2002). See also Lawrence Summers, Competition
Policy in the New Economy, 69 Antitrust L.J. 353, 358 (2001) (“it needs to be remembered
that the goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal is that there be efficiency”).
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efficient ways to do business. Only by devising more efficient means to
produce and distribute their goods, or by finding ways to offer superior
or additional features for the same cost, can firms displace sales by their
competitors. Antitrust enforcement therefore assumes as its mandate the
deterrence of business conduct that threatens to distort the competitive
process in product and innovation markets.
The fundamental reason we favor competition over monopoly is that
competition tends to drive markets to a more efficient use of scarce
resources. There are four distinct types of efficiencies that competition
promotes. Competition promotes allocative efficiency by leading firms to
produce output up to the point where the marginal cost of each unit
just equals the value of that unit to consumers. Competition promotes
productive efficiency by forcing firms to cut their costs in order not to lose
sales to more efficient rivals. Competition promotes dynamic efficiency
by stimulating investment and innovation. And competition promotes
transactional efficiency because, faced with competition, firms will seek out
the least expensive means of carrying out transactions.3
Over the last fifty years, the U.S. courts have increasingly recognized
that efficiencies are an essential part of rule of reason analysis under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The original formulation of the rule of
reason in Standard Oil spoke vaguely of condemning agreements that
“had not been entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose
of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade” but
instead for the purpose of “restraining the free flow of commerce and
tending to bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, that
were considered to be against the public interest.”4 Over time, this formu-
lation was replaced by a structured balancing test, under which the courts
weigh the likely anticompetitive effects of a restraint in terms of creat-
ing or enhancing market power against its procompetitive efficiency-
enhancing benefits.5
3 Because lawyers tend to think of efficiencies only in terms of production cost savings,
often neglecting allocative, transactional and dynamic efficiencies, we have appended to
this article an economic taxonomy of the four distinct types of efficiencies.
4 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). An even earlier decision in the Ninth
Circuit anticipated the Court’s approach in Standard Oil. See Hoffman v. McMullen, 83 F.
372, 376–77 (9th Cir. 1897) (noting that the common law allows “cooperation between
two or more persons to accomplish an object which neither could gain . . . alone . . .
although, in a certain sense and to a limited degree, such co-operation might have a
tendency to lessen competition”).
5 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (holding that the
inquiry under section 1 should focus on whether the practice is one that would “tend to
restrict competition and decrease output” or one “designed to increase economic efficiency
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Curiously, acceptance that efficiencies should also be an integral part
of the competitive effects analysis of mergers has come more slowly.
Until the 1982 Merger Guidelines, merger analysis was heavily driven by
structural presumptions based on market shares and market concentra-
tion. Indeed, the strength of these presumptions led the Supreme Court
in Brown Shoe 6 to treat protection of competition and the pursuit of
efficiencies as directly conflicting objectives. Even the Chicago School
during the 1960s and 1970s took a highly structural approach to merger
law. While Chicagoans criticized the merger decisions of the Warren
Court era (and the enforcement policy of the federal antitrust agencies
during that era) as setting the market share/concentration thresholds
for mergers too low, and while they warned that concentration could
well reflect underlying efficiencies of large-scale enterprises that would
be sacrificed by overly aggressive antitrust enforcement, their criticism
was not of the Court’s structural approach but rather of the low thresh-
olds for illegality.7
It may surprise many that the leading proponents for considering
efficiencies in merger evaluation came in the 1970s, not from Chicago,
but from Harvard. Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Donald Turner,
who had taught antitrust at Harvard for ten years before joining the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), included a very narrow efficiencies defense
in the first Merger Guidelines based on the work of Oliver Williamson,
a young economist. Little use was made of this defense, however, until
the 1980s, when merger law, stimulated by the 1982 Baxter guidelines,
began to shift decisively toward incorporating non-market share factors
in merger analysis. The first major widening of the efficiencies defense
occurred in 1984 when DOJ, under the leadership of J. Paul McGrath,
completely rewrote the efficiency section of the Merger Guidelines in a
way that transformed efficiencies from a defense, like the failing company
doctrine, into an integral part of the competitive effects analysis.
McGrath’s work endured largely unchanged through the 1992 joint
DOJ/Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Merger Guidelines until 1997,
when the Agencies revised the Guidelines to detail the tools they had
developed to evaluate efficiency claims based on thirteen years of experi-
ence applying the McGrath framework.
and render markets more rather than less competitive”). See generally ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments (4th ed. 1997).
6 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
7 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 111–13
(2d ed. 2001); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself
126–27 (1978).
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This article is a history of the progression of efficiencies in horizontal
merger analysis.8 It shows, as Oliver Williamson predicted in 1968, that
“once economies are admitted as a defense, the tools for assessing these
effects can be expected progressively to be refined.”9 That is exactly
what has happened, and as their tools have been refined, the agencies’
confidence in those tools has likewise grown, making the agencies more
comfortable weighing potential efficiency gains against potential market
power losses. This article also shows the influence the Guidelines have
had on gaining judicial acceptance of the importance of efficiencies in
determining whether a merger is likely substantially to lessen competi-
tion. And, finally, it shows the influence of the Guidelines in causing
other jurisdictions to recognize that efficiencies should play a central
role in merger review.
II. THE EARLY CASE LAW
Modern merger law in the United States began with the 1950 passage
of the Celler-Kefauver Act, which substantially broadened the reach of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. The first cases under the amended Section
7 reached the Supreme Court during the peak of the Warren Court.
During this period the Court showed a strong bias toward developing
per se rules whenever possible, thus obviating a case-by-case balancing
of the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the kind required
under the rule of reason.10
8 Although efficiencies are equally important to antitrust review of vertical and other
nonhorizontal mergers, those mergers are beyond the scope of this article. It has been
understood since 1951 that vertical integration, whether by merger or internal growth,
can enhance allocative efficiency by solving the double mark-up problem. See Lionel W.
McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 61 Econ. J. 785–803 (1951). It has
also been understood since 1937 that bringing more functions within a single firm can
enhance efficiency when it is less costly to organize the transactions involved within the
firm than through open market exchanges. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
Economica 386 (1937), reprinted in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the
Law (1988) (“A firm will tend to expand until the cost of organizing an extra transaction
within the firm becomes equal to the cost of carrying out the same transaction by means
of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing another firm.”); see generally
Oliver Williamson, Markets & Hierarchies (1975). This is what we would now refer
to as transactional efficiency. See Appendix. The courts have taken note of these efficiencies
in holding that a plaintiff must allege more than a de minimis foreclosure of rivals in
order to survive a motion to dismiss a challenge to a vertical merger. See, e.g., Alberta Gas
Chem. Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987). See generally
4A Phillip Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & Jon Solow, Antitrust Law 137–234 (rev.
ed. 1998).
9 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am.
Econ. Rev. 18, 34 (1969).
10 See, e.g., U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); U.S. v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote, “the only consistency is that
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This bias permeated the Warren Court’s Section 7 jurisprudence and
shaped its initial approach to efficiencies in merger cases. Brown Shoe,11
the first merger case to reach the Supreme Court under the amended
section 7, came very close to rejecting even the possibility of an efficien-
cies defense. After acknowledging that the House committee report for
the Celler-Kefauver Act had explicitly stated that the statute was not
intended to block a merger between two small companies that would
enable them to compete more effectively against larger firms—a concept
that seems to invite an efficiencies defense—the Court concluded that
Congress had nevertheless struck the balance in favor of competition
over efficiency:
But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competi-
tion, through the protection of viable, small, locally-owned business.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”12
Similarly, in its 1963 decision in Philadelphia National Bank,13 the Court
again indicated a hostility toward efficiency arguments: “a merger the
effect of which ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved
because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”14
The Warren Court’s antipathy toward efficiencies rose to new levels
in its 1967 decision finding unlawful Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) acquisi-
tion of Clorox.15 There, the Court in dicta again seemed to dismiss the
idea of an efficiencies defense, stating that, “[p]ossible economies cannot
be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers
which lessen competition may also result in economies, but it struck the
balance in favor of protecting competition.”16 Indeed, the P&G decision
seemed to treat efficiencies more as an offense than as a defense.17 In
the government always wins.” U.S. v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
11 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
12 Id. at 344.
13 U.S. v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
14 Id. at 371.
15 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
16 Id. at 580.
17 In his concurring decision, Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court’s treatment of
efficiencies. He wrote: “The Court says Congress chose competition over economies, but
didn’t consider ‘whether certain economies are inherent in the idea of competition.’ If
the effect of a merger on market-structure seems anticompetitive, the agency should weigh
possible efficiencies arising from the merger . . . to determine whether, on balance, competition has
been substantially lessened.” Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
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finding P&G’s acquisition of Clorox unlawful, the Court relied in part on
the FTC’s finding that the merger would “entrench” Clorox’s dominant
position in the bleach market because P&G would be able to advertise
Clorox jointly with its other products, thus reducing its advertising costs.18
Today, reductions in advertising costs are viewed as an efficiency.
III. THE 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES
Although they are now almost forgotten in the mists of history, the
1968 Merger Guidelines, which were released on the last day of Donald
Turner’s tenure as AAG for Antitrust, began the transformation of the
role of efficiencies in merger analysis.19 Turner was widely recognized
as one of the preeminent antitrust scholars of his generation, and is still
the only Ph.D.-trained economist to serve as head of the Antitrust Divi-
sion. When he became AAG, Turner selected Oliver Williamson, then
a relatively young economist teaching at the University of Pennsylvania,
to be his Special Economic Assistant. One of Williamson’s projects was
to study the role of efficiencies in merger review.20 The paper Williamson
drafted became the basis for his seminal 1968 article, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs.21 The article explains that a merger
that yields nontrivial real economies will only have a net negative alloca-
tive effect if it produces substantial market power resulting in relatively
large price increases.22 He also showed that cost savings almost always
benefit consumers because even a monopolist would pass some portion
of any cost savings on to its customers, unless its demand function
was perfectly inelastic. Williamson argued, therefore, that “a rational
treatment of the merger question requires that an effort be made to
establish the allocative implications of the scale economies and market
power effects of the merger” in determining whether it should be
found unlawful.23
Williamson’s work prompted Turner to incorporate into the 1968
Merger Guidelines a limited efficiencies defense. In particular, the 1968
18 Id. at 574.
19 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 10 (1968), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 4510 [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines]. Turner’s deputy for policy planning,
Robert A. Hammond, led the Guidelines project. His team included future Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer and future Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Donald Baker.
20 Insight into Williamson’s role at the DOJ was provided by James S. Campbell, who
served as an assistant to Turner.
21 Williamson, supra note 9.
22 Id. at 21. Williamson then introduced a number of qualifications to his model showing
that complicating the model did not detract from the conclusions drawn from it.
23 Id. at 18–19.
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Guidelines recognized that in some “exceptional circumstances” effi-
ciencies might justify a merger that would otherwise be subject to
challenge:
10. Economies. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Depart-
ment will not accept as a justification for an acquisition normally subject
to challenge under its horizontal merger standards the claim that the
merger will produce economies.24
This acknowledgment is remarkable given the antipathy toward effi-
ciencies found in the Warren Court decisions of the same era. For the
DOJ to break ranks with the Court and to say that efficiencies are good,
not bad, and that it would take them into consideration in appropriate
cases was an important step toward introducing greater economic ratio-
nality into merger law.
The 1968 Merger Guidelines gave three reasons for limiting the consid-
eration of efficiencies to exceptional circumstances:
(i) the Department’s adherence to the standards will usually result in
no challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to involve
companies operating significantly below the size necessary to achieve
significant economies of scale; (ii) where substantial economies are
potentially available to a firm, they can normally be realized through
internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in
accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies
claims for a merger.25
Adherents to the Chicago School objected to even this narrow an
efficiencies defense. They argued that, rather than considering efficien-
cies on a case-by-case basis, the thresholds for challenging mergers should
be set significantly higher and no merger-specific efficiencies defense
should be allowed.26 Their principal argument against an efficiency
defense was that it would be ” an intractable subject for litigation.”27
A. Practice Under the 1968 Merger Guidelines
Not surprisingly, given the Supreme Court’s apparent hostility to effi-
ciencies, parties made little use of efficiency arguments in efforts to
justify mergers for the first five years following issuance of the 1968
Guidelines. This began to change following the Supreme Court’s General
24 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 19, § 10.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 111–13. Posner proposed that a merger should not
be challenged unless it produced a market in which the top four firms had a 60% or
greater share.
27 Id. at 112.
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Dynamics decision in 1974.28 General Dynamics was the first time merger
parties successfully rebutted the government’s prima facie market share
case by showing that other industry factors established that the merger
would not substantially lessen competition. The parties proved that
uncommitted reserves were a better indicator of a firm’s future ability
to compete in the coal industry than its historic share of sales. Because
the acquired firm had essentially no uncommitted reserves, its elimina-
tion would not materially lessen competition. That decision gave rise to
what came to be known (somewhat loosely) as the “General Dynamics
defense” and encouraged parties to begin advancing efficiency
arguments.29
The narrow opening to an efficiencies defense offered by General
Dynamics was widened over the next five years by a series of non-merger
Supreme Court decisions. In GTE Sylvania,30 the Court overruled its
decision in Schwinn, 31 holding that nonprice vertical restraints should
be evaluated under the rule of reason because they “promote interbrand
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies
in the distribution of his products.”32 In BMI,33 the Court held that even
a horizontal agreement among competitors should not be characterized
as per se unlawful unless “the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output” and is not “designed to ‘increase economic efficiency and render
markets more rather than less competitive.’”34
Armed with these precedents, parties began increasingly in the late
1970s and early 1980s to include efficiencies arguments in presentations
to the agencies in merger investigations. The two examples below are
drawn from the private practice experience of one of the authors during
those years.
The first involved Ford’s proposed acquisition of a 35 percent equity
interest in Toyo Kogyo, the Japanese company that makes Mazda automo-
28 U.S. v. General Dynamics Co., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
29 For example, in International Harvester, the Seventh Circuit held that the acquired
firm’s financial condition forced it to pay more for capital, placing it at a competitive
disadvantage to its larger rivals, and that the merger would be efficiency-enhancing because
it would reduce the acquired firm’s cost of capital and would give the acquiring firm the
ability to market tractors incorporating the acquired firm’s superior technology. U.S. v.
International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
30 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 35 (1977) (GTE Sylvania).
31 U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
32 GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54.
33 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
34 Id. at 20. Significantly, neither of these cases involved production cost savings; rather,
both involved transactions cost savings. In GTE Sylvania, the nonprice restraints were a
more efficient way to solve the free rider problem than elaborate contracts would have
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biles. At the time, Ford was the second largest U.S. automaker with
roughly 20 percent of the U.S. market and Mazda had a small, but
growing, share of roughly one percent. These shares were high enough
to have justified a challenge under the 1968 Merger Guidelines. In
persuading the FTC not to challenge the transaction, Ford hired Oliver
Williamson to help explain that the equity interest was part of a broader
strategic alliance between Ford and Mazda pursuant to which Mazda
would be supplying a critical component (the transaxle) for a new plat-
form Ford was developing. This platform, which was ultimately sold in
the United States under the Escort nameplate, was designed as the first
“world car”—that is, it would be manufactured by Ford at its plants all
over the world and not just in North America. Using transactions cost
economics, Williamson showed that the equity interest was necessary to
align Ford’s and Mazda’s interests and to reduce the risk to Ford that
Mazda might engage in opportunistic behavior in the form of a hold-
up once Ford became dependent on it for this critical component.
Ford also showed that it expected to realize substantial efficiencies from
outsourcing this component to Mazda rather than producing it itself.
Based in part on these arguments, the FTC allowed the transaction to
proceed without a challenge, although it did insist initially that Ford put
some firewalls in place to limit its ability to influence Mazda’s competitive
decisionmaking with respect to the sale of automobiles in the United
States.
The second example involved an acquisition of the nickel cadmium
battery business of an American company, Gould, Inc., by the U.S. subsid-
iary of a major French nickel cadmium battery manufacturer, SAFT
America. The parties first attempted the transaction in 1980, but the
DOJ challenged it and the parties abandoned the transaction on the eve
of the preliminary injunction hearing. After William Baxter became
AAG, the parties renewed their efforts to secure clearance for the transac-
tion. The task appeared daunting, as the U.S. market had only four
players, with Gould the second largest with a 22 percent share. The
largest firm, GE, had over a 60 percent share and the third firm, Union
Carbide, had slightly over 10 percent, but was rapidly losing ground.
SAFT was a new entrant in the United States, where its share was small
but growing, but it was one of the largest producers worldwide. The
parties hired George Stigler, a future Nobel prize winner, as their eco-
nomic expert. With the help of a short but elegant white paper by Stigler,
the parties were able to persuade DOJ not to challenge the transaction
a second time, arguing that the economies of scale were very large
relative to the small size of the market and that a combined Gould/
been. And in BMI, the blanket license reduced the transactions costs associated with
negotiating and monitoring individual licenses.
World Composition Services  Sterling, VA  (571) 434-2510
ABA: Antitrust LJ Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003  ab4268ukol  08-22-03 10:26:38
✄ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUT HERE Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
[Vol. 71Antitrust Law Journal216
SAFT would be a more formidable competitor to the dominant firm,
GE, than they were separately.
Donald Turner worked with Williamson on the Ford/Toyo Kogyo
investigation. He was also, at the time, writing Volume IV of the enor-
mously influential normative treatise on antitrust law he co-authored
with Phillip Areeda. Volume IV dealt with mergers and was published
in 1980. In it, Areeda and Turner became the first widely respected
antitrust legal scholars to argue in favor of incorporating efficiencies
into the merger review process on a broader scale than the 1968 Merger
Guidelines contemplated.35
In their treatise, Areeda and Turner picked up the Williamsonian
theme that “one cannot formulate rational antitrust rules without consid-
ering how they help or hinder more efficient production and more
efficient resource allocation.”36 With this premise, they argued that “the
case for an economies defense is a strong one,” for three reasons.37 First,
mergers of inefficiently small firms are unlikely to impair competition
and may even intensify it. Second, even if price competition were lessened
as a result of an efficiency-enhancing merger, the detrimental effect
may be more than offset by the beneficial welfare effect of greater
efficiency. Third, preventing an efficiency-enhancing merger is likely to
be futile because the inefficient firms will likely disappear from the
market through attrition, leaving the market just as concentrated as the
merger would have made it.
Areeda and Turner showed that there was nothing in the statutory
language, the legislative history, or the prior court decisions that would
foreclose an efficiencies defense.38 In this regard, Areeda and Turner
also explained that it was something of a misnomer to refer to the role
of efficiencies as a “defense:”
Although we have, to be sure, spoken of an economies “defense,” it is
not as a defense to a final conclusion that a merger “lessens competition”
or is “illegal.” Rather, the “defense” terminology refers to the rebuttal
of a first order inference from a portion of the evidence (such as market
35 Phillip A. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application 146–99 (1980). The same year a then-unknown young
academic also published an article arguing in favor of a broader efficiencies defense.
Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 381 (1980).
36 Areeda & Turner, supra note 35, at 146.
37 Id. at 146.
38 Id. at 153.
World Composition Services  Sterling, VA  (571) 434-2510
ABA: Antitrust LJ Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003  ab4268ukol  08-22-03 10:26:38
✄ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUT HERE http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art31
2003] Merger Guidelines and Efficiencies 217
shares) that a merger presumptively lessens competition and violates
the statute. That is, it is a defense to a prima facie case.”39
In the remainder of their thirty-three-page section on efficiencies
(which subsequent editions have expanded) Areeda and Turner pro-
vided what remains to this day the most complete guidebook available
on how to apply an efficiencies defense in practice.
In contrast to Areeda and Turner, Chicago School adherents contin-
ued to argue that practical difficulties made it inadvisable to create
an efficiencies defense. In his influential book, The Antitrust Paradox,
published in 1978, Professor Bork recycled his earlier articles that argued
that the measurement of efficiencies was “beyond the capacities of the
law.”40 Bork maintained that, even if the claimed efficiencies could be
quantified, the problem of then having to balance them against any
potential increase in market power resulting from a merger in order to
determine the likely net effect on price and output would be “utterly
insoluable.”41
IV. 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES
In 1981, shortly after becoming AAG, William Baxter announced that
he planned to issue new guidelines to replace the 1968 Merger Guide-
lines. The ABA Section of Antitrust Law formed a task force to develop
proposed guidelines to submit to the DOJ.42 Following Areeda and
Turner’s lead, the task force recommended that the new guidelines
include efficiencies in their competitive effects analysis. The task force
was careful not to argue that potential efficiencies should be traded off
against a substantial lessening of competition, advocating only that they
should be used to rebut the presumption of illegality based on market
concentration and shares. The task force also argued that efficiencies
should influence the outcome only when the inference of anticompeti-
tive effect that could be drawn from market concentration and shares
was relatively weak (which it argued should be the case if the combined
shares were less than 30 percent).
The DOJ declined to follow this recommendation. Although the DOJ
raised the market share and concentration thresholds at which a chal-
lenge was likely, the efficiencies section of the 1968 Guidelines was
39 Id. at 153–54.
40 Bork, supra note 7, at 126–27.
41 Id. at 126.
42 Steven M. Edwards et al., Proposed Revisions of the Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines,
81 Colum. L. Rev. 1543 (1981). One of the authors served as a member of the task force.
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retained largely unchanged.43 Just as the 1968 Guidelines had limited
the consideration of efficiencies to “exceptional circumstances,” the 1982
Merger Guidelines provided that the DOJ would consider efficiencies
only in “extraordinary cases,” arguably an even more restrictive stan-
dard.44 The 1982 Merger Guidelines gave basically the same reasons for
not considering claims of “specific efficiencies” more broadly as the
1968 Guidelines had. First, they argued that the numerical market share
thresholds for challenging mergers were sufficiently high so that, “[i]n
the overwhelming majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to
achieve available efficiencies through mergers without interference from
the Department.”45 Second, they argued that efficiencies “are far easier
to allege than to prove,” and that, even where they exist, “their magni-
tudes would be extremely difficult to determine.”46 The 1982 Merger
Guidelines also tilted the playing field even further against efficiencies
by treating efficiencies as an affirmative defense, like the failing company
doctrine, and not as part of the agency’s competitive effects analysis.
In a footnote, the 1982 Merger Guidelines established four prerequi-
sites to any efficiencies claim. The DOJ required: (1) “clear and convinc-
ing evidence,” (2) in the form of “substantial cost savings resulting from
the realization of scale economies, integration of production facilities,
or multi-plant operations,” (3) that “are already enjoyed by one or more
firms in the industry,” (4) where “equivalent results could not be achieved
within a comparable period of time through internal expansion or a
merger that threatened less competitive harm.” Even where these pre-
requisites were met, the Guidelines provided that efficiencies would only
be considered in “otherwise close cases.”47
The 1982 Merger Guidelines, therefore, essentially followed the Chi-
cago School approach to efficiencies rather than the Areeda-Turner
Harvard School approach. As the Chicago School adherents had urged,
the Guidelines indirectly considered efficiencies by setting what then
were viewed as relatively high market share thresholds for challenges,48
but showed a reluctance to consider specific efficiency claims in individ-
ual cases. Tyler Baker, one of the principal authors of the Guidelines,
has written that at the time “there was no constituency among the lawyers
43 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 10.A. (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,102 [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and
Failure, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 497 (1983).
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or the economists at the Division for any materially different statement
of policy.”49
On the same day the 1982 DOJ Merger Guidelines were issued, the
FTC issued a Statement on Horizontal Mergers.50 The FTC Statement
took a slightly more favorable view of efficiencies. It indicated that the
FTC would consider “measurable operating efficiencies” in exercising
its prosecutorial discretion, but that they would not be treated as a legally
cognizable defense. The FTC stated that in considering efficiencies in
the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion it would require “substantial
evidence” showing cost savings that “clearly outweigh” any increase in
market power.
V. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES
The efficiencies section of the 1982 Merger Guidelines was one of
two sections of the Guidelines that were substantially revised in 1984 as
a direct result of the DOJ’s experience in reviewing the LTV-Republic
steel merger.51 After an initial challenge, the DOJ settled the case to
allow the merger with divestment of two steel mills.52 In approving the
settlement over a number of objections, the court noted the “weakened
and deteriorating condition” of the U.S. steel industry and found that
approving the settlement would be in the public interest because it would
allow a merger to proceed which was designed “to achieve savings in
cost through efficiencies which will enable the surviving company to
compete more effectively both here and in export markets.”53
49 Tyler A. Baker, The 1984 Justice Department Guidelines, 53 Antitrust L.J. 327, 333 (1984).
50 James E. McCarty, 467 PLI/CORP 213, 225 (1984).
51 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Merger Guidelines § 3.5 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep
(CCH) ¶ 13,103 [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines]. The other section revised dealt
with the treatment of imports. In addition, there were other, minor changes. J. Paul
McGrath, the AAG at the time, credits his deputy, Charles F. Rule, for leading the team
responsible for the revisions.
52 The Department initially challenged the merger in its entirety, alleging that it was
likely substantially to lessen competition in three markets: (1) carbon and alloy hot rolled
sheet and strip steel, (2) carbon and alloy cold rolled sheet and strip steel, and (3) stainless
cold roll sheet and strip steel. The Department found that while imports could have
important competitive effects in the domestic market, trade restrictions limited such import
competition. The Department also found that the efficiencies the parties claimed were
not sufficient to overcome the serious potential anticompetitive effects from a merger
that would produce post-merger HHIs in two relevant markets of 1,100 and 1,000.
In explaining his decision to accept the settlement, AAG McGrath said that the parties
had provided “very persuasive evidence that the combined operation of several plants
could have, and indeed should have, and probably would have resulted in substantial cost
savings” and that this “was a factor that led to the Department’s approval of a restructured
transaction.” 60 Minutes with J. Paul McGrath—Interview, 54 Antitrust L.J. 131, 141 (1985).
53 U.S. v. LTV Corp., 1984 WL 21973, *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1984).
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Echoing these sentiments, the DOJ made four major changes to the
treatment of efficiencies in the Guidelines. DOJ noted that “the effi-
ciency-enhancing potential of mergers can increase the competitiveness
of firms and can result in lower prices to consumers,”54 and explained
that changes were necessary because the language of the 1982 Guidelines
“has a restrictive, somewhat misleading tone” suggesting that DOJ “would
explicitly consider efficiency claims only in ‘extraordinary cases,’”
whereas “[i]n practice, the Department never ignores efficiency claims.”55
The revisions, it said, were intended to correct this misimpression and
to provide further guidance as to how efficiencies would be evaluated.
First, the efficiencies section of the Guidelines was moved from the
“defenses” section to the “competitive effects” section. Then-AAG Paul
McGrath himself emphasized the importance of this shift:
In looking at a given proposed merger, particularly one that is some-
place near those thresholds, we look a good deal harder at other sur-
rounding circumstances to come up with an overall assessment as to
whether the proposed merger . . . is likely to lessen competition. One
of those factors we consider is efficiencies, and I remind you that in
the 1984 Guidelines efficiencies are listed as another factor, rather than
as a defense.56
McGrath added that under this approach the DOJ would not “balance
expected efficiencies against expected anticompetitive consequences.”57
Instead, borrowing from Areeda-Turner, he said the Division would look
at efficiencies in determining whether the merger was anticompetitive
at all.58 McGrath added that he expected this to be the exception rather
than the rule: “It does not happen very often that a firm comes in with
very good proof that such efficiencies will result.”59
Second, the 1984 revision added an introductory paragraph that explic-
itly acknowledged that “the primary benefit of mergers to the economy
is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the competi-
tiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”60 This para-
graph went on to recite, however, just as the earlier versions had, that
because the Guidelines proscribed only mergers that present a significant
danger to competition, they would “in the majority of cases . . . allow
54 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 3.5.
55 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 1984 WL 304008 ( June
14, 1984).
56 60 Minutes With J. Paul McGrath, supra note 52, at 141.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 3.5.
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firms to achieve available efficiencies through mergers without interfer-
ence from the Department.”61
Third, the 1984 version expanded its explanations of the criteria the
Department would use in evaluating claimed efficiencies. Specifically,
• While eliminating the language that said the Department would
consider efficiencies only in “extraordinary” cases, the revisions
retained the 1982 requirement that efficiencies be established by
“clear and convincing evidence.”62
• In place of the requirement that the parties prove that “equivalent
results could not be achieved within a comparable period of time
through internal expansion or through a merger that threatened
less competitive harm,” the revisions substituted a somewhat looser
requirement that the merger be “reasonably necessary” to achieve
the efficiencies.63
• Whereas the 1982 Guidelines had required that the efficiencies be
“substantial,” the 1984 Guidelines required that the efficiencies be
“significant,” a somewhat more flexible standard.64
• Instead of providing that efficiencies would be considered “only in
resolving otherwise close cases,” the 1984 Merger Guidelines indi-
cated that the DOJ would use a sliding scale to evaluate efficiencies
so that the more significant the competitive risks, the higher the
level of efficiencies the parties would be required to establish.
• The revisions eliminated the language from the 1982 Merger Guide-
lines that required the parties to show that the efficiencies were
“already enjoyed by one or more firms in the industry.”65
The fourth, and final, change, was the inclusion of a more comprehen-
sive list of the types of efficiencies DOJ would consider. The 1982 Merger
Guidelines had limited consideration to “substantial cost savings resulting
from the realization of scale economies, integration of production facili-
ties, or multi-plant operation.”66 The 1984 Guidelines adopted the less-
restrictive formulation that “[c]ognizable efficiencies include, but are
not limited to,” these particular efficiencies, and stated that DOJ would
also consider “similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing,
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 5.A.
66 Id.
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servicing, or distribution operations of the merged firm,” as well as
those “resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and
overhead expenses.”67
At the time of these changes, many characterized the shift to a “quali-
fiedly hospitable”68 approach to efficiencies as “dramatic,”69 claiming the
agency had “virtually reversed course.”70 They attributed the change to
“the political and public relations beating taken by the DOJ over its
initial handling of the Jones and Loughlin-Republic merger.”71 The
authors of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, including both Bill Baxter and
Tyler Baker, “question[ed] the wisdom of the change,”72 fearing that it
would “lead to undue political influence in the enforcement process.”73
Looking back nearly twenty years later, we can see that the change
from 1982 to 1984 was indeed significant. It moved DOJ from the Chicago
camp, which opposed consideration of merger-specific efficiencies as
unmanageable, to the Harvard camp, represented by Areeda-Turner,
which (inspired by Williamson) argued that rational antitrust policy
required doing no less. Whether the changes were driven by political
considerations or not is unimportant. What is more important is that
they contributed importantly toward fully integrating efficiencies into
modern merger analysis.
VI. 1980S FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRACTICE
Although the FTC did not follow the DOJ’s lead and revise its 1982
Merger Policy Statement, the FTC began to assign greater weight to
efficiencies in its decision making, and parties more frequently made
efficiency arguments. In a 1984 hospital merger decision, the FTC went
out of its way to explain that prior judicial decisions did not foreclose
consideration of efficiencies in evaluating the competitive effects of
mergers, relying largely on arguments developed in a 1980 law review
article by Timothy Muris, who recently had become Director of the
Bureau of Competition.74 Nonetheless, in that case the FTC affirmed
67 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 51, § 5.A.
68 Ronald W. Davis, Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures in the 1980s:
A Pragmatic Guide to Evaluation of Legal Risks, 11 Del. J. Corp. L. 25, 87 (1986).
69 David A. Clanton, Recent Merger Developments: Coming of Age Under the Guidelines, 53
Antitrust L.J. 345, 351 (1984).
70 Id. at 351.
71 Davis, supra note 68, at 87.
72 Baker, supra note 49.
73 Davis, supra note 68, at 87.
74 See American Med. Int’l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 71–81 (1984); see also Muris, supra note 35.
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the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that the parties had failed
to establish that any substantial efficiencies would flow from its merger
or that they would inure to the benefit of consumers.
The same year, the FTC relied on efficiencies as one of its reasons
for approving a production joint venture between General Motors and
Toyota to produce small cars in North America, subject to a consent
order imposing restrictions on the output of the joint venture and safe-
guards on information sharing between the parties.75 The Commission
found that the venture, which it said it might otherwise not have allowed
to proceed, would produce three procompetitive benefits: (1) it would
increase the number of small cars available in America; (2) the joint
venture would be able to produce these cars at a lower cost than GM
could through any alternative available to it; and (3) the venture would
offer GM an opportunity to learn more about efficient Japanese manufac-
turing and management techniques that could help it lower its costs
generally. Although not a merger case, the GM/Toyota decision illustrated
that the FTC, like the DOJ, was becoming more receptive to efficiency
arguments. This naturally led parties to make such arguments more
frequently.
To use another example drawn from the private practice experience
of one of the authors, in 1990, efficiency arguments played a key role
in securing FTC clearance, over serious staff objections, for a merger of
the two leading worldwide producers of turbo expanders, which are used
to liquefy gases. The merger created a firm with market shares, both in
the United States and globally, well in excess of 60 percent. The parties
argued that, despite these high market shares, the merger would not be
anticompetitive because (1) some of the buyers were vertically integrated
and the others could enter or sponsor entry into the turboexpander
market; (2) the acquired firm was in serious financial jeopardy and might
otherwise have to exit the market; and (3) if it did so, its technology,
most of which was in the head of its eighty-four-year-old founder, might
be lost, whereas the merger would allow that technology to be transferred
to younger engineers at the acquiring firm (this was dubbed the
“Yoda defense”).76
VII. 1980s JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The courts had little occasion following the 1982 and 1984 Merger
Guidelines to consider efficiencies in a merger context. In 1986 in Cargill,
75 See General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
76 This efficiency argument focuses on a transactional efficiency stemming from the
transfer of technological know-how between two producers. Information-based assets pre-
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Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 77 the Court implicitly overruled its earlier
decision in Procter & Gamble to the extent that decision might have been
understood to hold that a merger could be found to violate Section 7
because it would make an already leading firm more efficient. Cargill
arose from a private action brought by a competitor seeking to enjoin
the proposed merger of two leading meat packers. The plaintiff claimed
it would be injured because the merger would produce “multiplant
efficiencies” that would enable the merged firm to lower prices in order
to compete for market share. The Supreme Court held that “it would
be inimical to the purposes of the antitrust laws” to enjoin a merger
because it would lead to increased efficiency and lower prices:
To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of
profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal
any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share.
The antitrust laws require no such perverse result, for “[i]t is in the
interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous
price competition, including price competition.”78
VIII. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES
In 1992, the DOJ undertook an extensive revision of the 1984 Merger
Guidelines, which the FTC joined for the first time.79 The principal
change of the 1992 Guidelines from earlier versions was to shift decision
making more fully away from structural presumptions based on market
shares and concentration ratios and to place greater emphasis on qualita-
tive competitive effects analysis, or what one of the revised Guidelines’
principal authors, Robert Willig, called “story telling.”80
The 1992 Merger Guidelines left the language of the efficiencies
section unchanged from the 1984 version, with one exception. The one
change was the removal of the sentence that provided that efficiencies
would not be considered unless they were “established by clear and
convincing evidence.” In explaining the reason for this change, Kevin
sent challenging monitoring and pricing problems for would-be transactors, and sometimes
no arrangement short of outright transferral of ownership over the asset—in this case, a
merger—can satisfactorily solve these problems. For further discussion of transactional
efficiencies, and their contrast with other categories of efficiencies, see the Appendix, infra.
77 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
78 Id. at 492 (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050,
1057 (6th Cir. 1984)).
79 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4
(1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guide-
lines].
80 See Charles A. James, Overview of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 Antitrust
L.J. 447, 448, 452 (1993).
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Arquit, who served as Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition when
the 1992 Guidelines were being drafted, argued that “no substantive
change was intended” by this change.81 Eliminating the “clear and con-
vincing evidence” standard, he said, was simply part of the effort to move
away from structural presumptions and not to assign burdens of proof.
Despite Arquit’s protestations, the change was obviously significant as
it signaled a greater openness to considering efficiency arguments and
was so viewed by many in the bar at the time. Given the uncertainties
inherent in trying to predict the likely effect of a merger, how high a
standard of proof is required will often be determinative.
And, indeed, after the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the agencies continued
to gain experience reviewing efficiencies, as merging parties continued
to make efficiencies claims in merger investigations.82 Scholars and prac-
titioners also continued to offer critical commentary about the treatment
of efficiencies in the Guidelines.83
In 1992, Robert Pitofsky published a widely noted article advocating
broader use of efficiencies in merger reviews.84 Tying efficiencies to the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in an increasingly global economy, Pitofsky
argued that, “in some market situations, consideration of [efficiency]
factors . . . could make a significant difference in the ability of firms to
compete in international trade.”85 He argued further that “efficiencies
do not lessen—indeed they often improve—competition” and that con-
sideration of efficiencies could be consistent with section 7’s “substantial
lessening of competition” analysis.86 He proposed an efficiencies defense
“where the likelihood of realizing efficiencies is maximized and the
likelihood of consumer injury as a result of an increase in market power is
minimized.”87 Key features of his proposal were a focus on (1) production
81 Kevin J. Arquit, Perspectives on the 1992 U.S. Government Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 795
PLI/CORP 33 (1992).
82 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm’n, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition
Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace: A Report by Federal Trade
Commission Staff, vol. I. ch. 2 at 14, 21 (1996) [hereinafter FTC Staff Report].
83 E.g., Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 19
World Competition L. & Econ. Rev. 5 (1996); Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger
Analysis, 62 Antitrust L.J. 513, 522–27 (1994); Steve Stockum, The Efficiencies Defense for
Horizontal Mergers: What Is the Government’s Standard?, 61 Antitrust L.J. 829 (1993).
84 Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy,
81 Geo. L.J. 195 (1992).
85 Id. at 198.
86 Id. at 211, 247.
87 Id. at 218. His proposal was: “In any market where postmerger concentration is moder-
ate, and the combined company after the merger would hold less than thirty-five percent
of the market, a horizontal merger should be legal if the defendants can clearly support
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efficiencies that reduce unit costs and (2) the inability to achieve the
efficiencies through less restrictive alternatives.
IX. THE 1997 REVISIONS
When Professor Pitofsky became FTC Chairman in 1995, one of his
early initiatives was to revive the FTC’s prior practice of conducting
hearings on important issues of antitrust policy. Pursuing the concerns
addressed in his 1992 article, Chairman Pitofsky directed that the first
hearings focus on the changing nature of competition in an increasingly
global and innovation-based economy.88 Efficiencies became one of the
main subjects addressed both at those hearings and in the ensuing FTC
staff report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New
High-Tech, Global Marketplace Competition.89 The report endorsed further
integrating efficiencies into the competitive effects analysis,90 arguing
that efficiencies should “constitute a rebuttal [to a market-share-based
prima facie case], not an affirmative defense.”91
The FTC Report led to the formation of a joint FTC-DOJ task force
to consider the efficiencies issue and prepare revisions to the Guide-
lines.92 The revisions issued in 1997 (1997 Revisions) entirely replaced
the section devoted to efficiencies. Nonetheless, the revised section was
presented as reflecting a more thorough explanation of existing practice
rather than a change in policy.93
The 1997 Revisions retained the introductory language from the 1984
and 1992 Guidelines declaring that “the primary benefit of mergers to
the economy is their potential to generate . . . efficiencies.” The new
Section 4, however, explained in greater detail that the mechanism by
which efficiencies could increase the competitiveness of firms was by
“increasing their incentive and ability to compete.” It also expanded the
the claim that production efficiencies leading to a substantial reduction in unit costs
will result and these efficiencies could not be achieved through a much less restrictive
alternative.” Id. at 218. He rejected any pass-through requirement. Id. at 219.
88 Federal Trade Comm’n, Hearings on FTC Policy in Relation to the Changing Nature
of Competition; Notice of Public Hearing and Opportunity for Comment, 60 Fed. Reg.
37,449 (1995) (issues included “treatment of efficiencies in merger and nonmerger areas”).
89 FTC Staff Report, supra note 82.
90 Id. Exec. Summ. at 2.
91 Id. ch. 2 at 25.
92 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
Announce Revisions to Merger Guidelines (Apr. 8, 1997).
93 “The revisions better reflect existing practices at the agencies, and provide better
guidance to merging parties,” said Larry Fullerton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Merger Enforcement in the Department’s Antitrust Division. Id.
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list of benefits to include “improved quality, enhanced service, or new
products” in addition to lower prices.94
The first major change of the 1997 Revisions was the provision of a
more systematic explanation of when efficiencies would be viewed as
“cognizable” and therefore entitled to consideration. Cognizable effi-
ciencies were defined by three characteristics: “Cognizable efficiencies are
[1] merger-specific efficiencies that [2] have been verified and [3] do
not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”95
A. Merger-Specific Efficiencies
The revision defined “merger-specific” efficiencies as “efficiencies
likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be
accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another
means having comparable anticompetitive effects.”96 This formulation
is subtly different from the “reasonably necessary” standard of the earlier
guidelines in refocusing attention away from whether the efficiencies
“could” be accomplished without the merger to whether they would be
“likely” absent the merger.97
The difference is much more significant than it may at first appear.
There are any number of reasons why a firm may not pursue efficiencies
through internal means even if technically it would be feasible to do so.98
For example, to the extent the efficiencies are a function of economies of
scale, a firm may not wish to add capacity to achieve those greater
efficiencies where the effect may be to further depress existing market
prices. Second, achieving the efficiencies through internal means may
be substantially more costly than by merger, reducing the return on
investment below necessary hurdle rates. Third, and perhaps most
94 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4
(as amended Apr. 8, 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 [hereinafter
1997 Revisions].
95 Id. § 4.
96 Id. The Guidelines elaborated this principle in two sentences. First, “[t]he Agency
will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be preserved by practical
alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or licensing.” Id. § 4
n.35. Second, “[o]nly alternatives that are practical in the business situation faced by the
merging firms will be considered in making this determination; the Agency will not insist
upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.” Id. § 4.
97 This shift brought the analysis of efficiencies into line with the treatment of entry,
expansion, and repositioning in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, as to all of which the
guidelines make the likelihood, not merely the feasibility, of those changes occurring the
relevant criterion.
98 See William J. Kolasky, Lessons from Baby Food: The Role of Efficiencies in Merger Review,
Antitrust, Fall 2001, at 82.
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important, to the extent the efficiencies result from combining the com-
plementary assets of the two merging firms, which could theoretically
also be done by contract, transactions costs may form an obstacle to
achieving these efficiencies other than through merger.99 In addition,
to the extent joint ventures or other competitor collaborations are viewed
as a potentially less restrictive alternative to merger, the 1997 Revisions
properly focus attention on the incentive and cooperation problems
inherent in such collaborations.100
B. Not Anticompetitive
The 1997 Revisions do not elaborate on the statement that merger
efficiencies are not cognizable if they “arise from anticompetitive reduc-
tions in output or service.”101 It is true that reductions of output, for
example, will normally be accompanied by reductions in (total) costs,
but this cost reduction is not an efficiency. Similarly, elimination of
rivalry between the merging firms may mean that the merged firm may
be able to cut its cost of acquiring customers or to spend less in providing
service to its customers. To the merging firms, such changes certainly
represent cost savings and merging firms sometimes mistakenly try to
treat these savings as efficiencies. This provision reminds the reader
that the focus in analyzing efficiencies is on changes that improve, not
degrade, allocative efficiency.
C. Verifiable Efficiencies
The revisions require that efficiencies be verified to be cognizable.
They explain this requirement on the grounds that “[e]fficiencies are
difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the information
relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging
firms.”102 Consequently, the Guidelines, as revised, provide:
the merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency
can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each
asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any
costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability
99 Contrary to the sometimes offered view that, because they fall short of a full merger,
joint ventures necessarily are less anticompetitive than mergers, transaction cost obstacles
to achieving efficiencies could well lead to a situation in which a joint venture would raise
competitive concerns whereas a merger among the very same participants would not be
problematic because the merger was thought to lead to greater efficiency-enhancing
integration. See William Nye, Can a Joint Venture Lessen Competition More Than a Merger?, 40
Econ. Letters 487 (1992).
100 We thank Gregory J. Werden for contributing this insight.
101 1997 Revisions, supra note 94, § 4.
102 Id.
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and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.
Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative
or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.103
Significantly, this language does not necessarily require that the efficien-
cies be quantified in every case. Just as the market power effects of a
merger often cannot be measured precisely, so, too, some important
efficiencies, especially those relating to allocative, dynamic, and transac-
tional efficiencies, do not always lend themselves to precise estimation.
Having defined cognizable efficiencies, the 1997 Revisions next
address the issue of how these cognizable efficiencies will be taken into
account in the competitive effects analysis. They state that the agencies
“will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character
and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive
in any relevant market.”104 They further explain that the agencies will
consider “whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to
reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by
preventing price increases in that market.”105 As in the 1984 and 1992
Merger Guidelines, the 1997 Revisions provide for the use of a sliding
scale:
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger . . .
the greater must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to
conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the
relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive effect of a
merger is likely to be particularly large, extraordinarily great cognizable
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anti-
competitive.106
The 1997 Revisions sound an additional cautionary note in this regard:
“In the Agency’s experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a differ-
ence in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects,
absent the efficiencies, are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a
merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”107
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. (emphasis added).
106 Id. The Revisions also distinguish between the various types of efficiencies. The
Revisions indicate that “certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be cognizable
and substantial than others,” singling out “efficiencies resulting from shifting production
among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce
the marginal cost of production.” By contrast, “those relating to research and develop-
ment[] are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may
be the result of anticompetitive output reductions.” Others, such as “those relating to
procurement, management, or capital cost are less likely to be merger-specific or substan-
tial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.”
107 Id.
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One of the principal debates while the 1997 Revisions were being
formulated related to whether efficiencies had to be passed on to con-
sumers in order to be cognizable.108 Most economists argued for what
they called a “total welfare” approach, which would view all efficiencies
positively, whether or not they were passed on to consumers in the form
of lower prices. They argued that all resource savings benefit society
and that any wealth transfer from consumers to producers should be
irrelevant because, put colloquially, producers are consumers in their
time off. Chairman Pitofsky himself took this view, both in his 1992
article and in comments he made while Chairman of the FTC prior to
the issuance of the 1997 Revisions.109
Most commentators have interpreted the 1997 Revisions as adopting
not this broader formation but rather a “consumer welfare” approach
to efficiencies, which counts efficiencies only to the extent they are likely
to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices and expanded
output. A close reading of the 1997 Revisions, however, shows that the
agencies preserved the possibility of weighing positively efficiencies that
would not immediately be passed on to consumers. The revisions did
not include a pass-on requirement in defining cognizable efficiencies.
They specify that: “The Agency will also consider the effects of cognizable
efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the relevant
market.”110 It would probably be accurate, therefore, to call the approach
taken by the 1997 Revisions a hybrid consumer welfare/total welfare
model rather than one or the other.111 Efficiencies that benefit consumers
immediately through lower prices and increased output will receive the
most weight, but other efficiencies will also be considered, to the extent
they can be proved and can be shown ultimately to benefit consumers.112
108 See, e.g., Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger Efficiencies: Reconsidering the “Passing-
On” Requirement, 64 Antitrust L.J. (1996); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard,
Efficiencies from the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 707 (1999); Craig W. Conrath
& Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis: Hostility or Humility?, 7 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. 685 (1999).
109 Pitofsky, supra note 84; Roundtable Discussion with Enforcement Officials, 63 Antitrust
L.J. 951, 981 (1995).
110 1997 Revisions, supra note 94, § 4 n.37. The note cautions, however, that these benefits
“will be given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”
Again, we thank Greg Werden for bringing the significance of this footnote to our attention.
111 See Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies,
Antitrust, Summer 1997, at 12, 13–14 (suggesting that revision left open the question
whether the effect of efficiencies should be evaluated against “price effects” standard,
“consumer surplus” standard, or “total surplus” standard).
112 The DOJ’s economists have developed a simple method for determining when effi-
ciencies are likely to prevent price increases in the two standard unilateral effects models.
See Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers
of Differentiated Products, 44 J. Indus. Econ. 409 (1996); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M.
World Composition Services  Sterling, VA  (571) 434-2510
ABA: Antitrust LJ Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003  ab4268ukol  08-22-03 10:26:38
✄ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUT HERE http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art31
2003] Merger Guidelines and Efficiencies 231
In a footnote to the Revisions, the agencies addressed the possibility
that a merger with anticompetitive effects in one market may have more
substantial efficiency-enhancing effects in another market or markets.113
Because accepting a merger on such grounds would necessarily mean
accepting anticompetitive harm to some consumers, the footnote
explains that such mergers “normally” would be challenged, after a
market-by-market analysis. The footnote also provides, however, that a
merger might be accepted if the efficiencies are “inextricably linked” to
the anticompetitive harm—that is, the harm cannot be avoided in the
usual manner by a divestiture or other similar relief—and if the imbal-
ance is substantial (i.e., the efficiencies are large and the anticompetitive
effect small).
A merger of two natural gas-gathering systems that the FTC cleared
while it was working on the 1997 Revisions illustrates how these principles
apply in practice. Gathering systems transport natural gas from the well-
head to the nearest processing plant or transmission pipeline. This partic-
ular merger involved two companies that operated gathering systems
and processing plants in West Texas in the area around Midland-Odessa,
an area with very mature fields and declining production. The two merg-
ing systems were the only systems serving several counties west of Odessa,
making this a merger to monopoly in these counties.114 The parties
nevertheless were able to obtain clearance by showing that only a handful
of producers were close enough to both systems to benefit from competi-
tion between them whereas all producers served by the two systems would
benefit from the very substantial economies that could be realized by
combining the two systems and their associated processing plants, both
of which were badly underutilized.
X. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF EFFICIENCIES
The evolving treatment of efficiencies in the various versions of the
Merger Guidelines has been influential in shaping the judicial treatment
Froeb, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Homogeneous
Products, 58 Econ. Letters 367 (1998).
113 1997 Revisions, supra note 94, at n.36. The 1992 Merger Guidelines had not directly
addressed this question, noting generally that “[s]ome mergers that the Agency otherwise
might challenge may be reasonably necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies,” a
statement that does not address whether the efficiencies must be in the same market as
the anticompetitive effect.
114 The FTC defines the relevant geographic market for natural gas gathering in terms
of the distance a gathering system will go to serve a new customer, which is typically only
a few miles. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., FTC Docket No. C-3634 (consent order
entered Dec. 29, 1995), available at 1995 WL 170 12700 (Dec. 28, 1995). Because of the
small size of the wells in question and the declining production in the area generally,
entry was also unlikely.
World Composition Services  Sterling, VA  (571) 434-2510
ABA: Antitrust LJ Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003  ab4268ukol  08-22-03 10:26:38
✄ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUT HERE Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
[Vol. 71Antitrust Law Journal232
of efficiencies. Just as the agencies have, the courts increasingly have
begun to accept the idea that efficiencies may, in appropriate circum-
stances, be used to rebut a prima facie case of anticompetitive effect
based on market concentration. In addition, the courts have largely
adopted the analytical framework for evaluating efficiency claims that is
set out in the Guidelines.
A. Circuit Court Decisions
Although the Supreme Court has not had an occasion to revisit the
issue of whether efficiencies can be used as a defense in a merger case
since its early decisions, four circuits have considered the issue. All four
have shown a willingness to treat efficiencies as serving to rebut a prima
facie showing of anticompetitive effect based on market share and con-
centration and have generally applied the same analytical framework as
that embodied in the Merger Guidelines.
1. FTC v. University Health, Inc.115
The Eleventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to hold squarely that
efficiencies may be used to rebut a prima facie showing of anticompetitive
effect.116 The court did not cite the Guidelines in reaching this conclu-
sion, but relied instead principally on the Areeda-Turner treatise and
other scholarly articles advocating an efficiencies defense. The approach
the court adopted nevertheless closely mirrored the then-extant 1984
Merger Guidelines. The court held that efficiencies should not be a
defense to a merger that was found to be anticompetitive, but should
instead be integrated into the competitive effects analysis, where they
could be used to rebut a prima facie case based on market share presump-
tions. In addition, the court held that in order to be considered, the
efficiencies would have to be “significant” and “ultimately [to] benefit
competition and, hence, consumers.”117 Applying these standards, the
court of appeals found that the parties had not presented sufficient
evidence of efficiences and reversed the district court’s denial of a prelim-
inary injunction.118
2. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.119
In a 1997 per curiam decision affirming the denial of a preliminary
injunction, the Sixth Circuit rejected an FTC argument that the district
115 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
116 Id. at 1222.
117 Id. at 1223.
118 Id.
119 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
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court had committed legal error in allowing the merging hospitals to
rebut the FTC’s prima facie case with evidence of efficiencies. Citing
University Health and Rockford Memorial Hospital,120 where the Seventh
Circuit had held that section only “forbids mergers that are likely to hurt
consumers,”121 the court held that the district court’s approach “was not
legally erroneous,” without further explanation.
3. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp.122
In the most favorable court of appeals decision on efficiencies to date,
the Eighth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction blocking the merger
of the only two general-care hospitals in Poplar Bluff, Missouri. The
court found two errors in the district court’s decision, both relevant to
its view of the claimed efficiencies. First, the court held that the FTC
had produced “insufficient evidence” to prove that Poplar Bluff was a
separate geographic market and not part of a broader Southeastern
Missouri market.123 Second, the court held that the district court had
committed legal error in refusing to consider “evidence of enhanced
efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the merger.”124
The court described that evidence as showing that combining the two
hospitals would create a larger and more efficient hospital capable of
delivering better medical care and that this would “enhance competition”
in the broader Southeastern Missouri area. The court noted that even
if third party payors “reaped the benefit of a price war in a small corner
of the health care market in southeastern Missouri,” the loss of that
benefit needed to be balanced against the improved quality of health
care received by their subscribers.125
4. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.126
In the most recent court of appeals decision addressing efficiencies,
the D.C. Circuit noted that “the trend among lower courts is to recognize
the defense.”127 The court held, however, that the parties had failed to
produce sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of anticompetitive
effect and that the district court’s finding to the contrary in denying a
preliminary injunction was clearly erroneous. Citing the 1997 Guidelines’
120 U.S. v. Rockford Mem. Hosp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
121 Id. at 1282.
122 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
123 Id. at 1053.
124 Id. at 1054.
125 Id.
126 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
127 Id. at 720.
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statement that efficiencies would never justify a merger to monopoly or
near-monopoly, the court found that the very high concentration levels
required, on rebuttal, “proof of extraordinary efficiencies.”128 The court
also relied on the 1997 Merger Guidelines for its conclusion that asserted
efficiencies must be “merger specific” to be cognizable.129 The court held
that the district court had committed error by failing to explain why the
parties could not achieve comparable efficiencies without a merger.130
B. District Court Decisions
District court decisions increasingly assume the availability of an effi-
ciencies defense, often citing the Merger Guidelines to support their
assumption. The defense has achieved mixed results in the courts: in
three cases the courts accepted the defense and in four the courts rejected
it.131 In each case, however, the court used the basic analytical framework
set out in the Merger Guidelines to evaluate the claimed efficiencies.
1. U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center132
In finding the merger of two hospitals on Long Island lawful over the
Department’s objections, the court adopted the Guidelines’ approach
and held that to rebut a prima facie case of illegality the efficiencies
claimed must be “significant” and must be shown “ultimately to benefit
consumers.”133 The court held that to meet this standard the parties
must prove that the merger is likely to “enhance rather than hinder
competition because of increased efficiency.”134 The court found that
the efficiencies that were claimed, which were on the order of $25–30
million per year, met both standards, in part, because the hospitals were
nonprofit and would therefore be likely to pass any cost savings on to
the community, which they had also committed to doing in an agreement
with the New York State Attorney General.
128 Id. at 720. In Heinz, the merging parties were two of only three producers of baby
food in a market in which entry was found to be unlikely, and were the only two rivals
for placement as the second baby food brand on supermarket shelves.
129 Id. at 721.
130 One of the authors of this article has criticized the court of appeals decision for
giving too little deference to the district court’s findings of fact and for applying too high
a standard both with respect to the magnitude of the efficiencies and to the likelihood
that they could be realized by alternative, less anticompetitive means. See Kolasky, supra
note 98, at 82. For a different perspective on the case, see Thomas B. Leary, An Inside Look
at the Heinz Case, Antitrust, Spring 2002, at 32; David Balto, The Efficiency Defense in
Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation, Antitrust, Fall 2001, at 74.
131 This excludes the cases decided on appeal discussed in the previous section.
132 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
133 Id. at 137.
134 Id.
World Composition Services  Sterling, VA  (571) 434-2510
ABA: Antitrust LJ Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003  ab4268ukol  08-22-03 10:26:38
✄ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CUT HERE http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art31
2003] Merger Guidelines and Efficiencies 235
2. U.S. v. Country Lakes Foods, Inc.135
This case, a DOJ challenge to a merger of two dairies, is the only
litigated non-hospital case in which an efficiencies defense has prevailed.
In finding the merger lawful, the court found that the efficiencies that
would result from an increased volume of production due to the merger
would enable the merged firm “to compete directly with the market
leader” and thereby “enhance competition.”136 As in Tenet, this conclu-
sion depended importantly on the court’s related conclusion that the
government had failed to prove that the geographic market was as narrow
as it had alleged.
3. Staples,137 Cardinal Health,138 and Swedish Match139
This trilogy of FTC preliminary injunction cases in the District Court
for the District of Columbia all closely followed the analytical framework
of the Merger Guidelines in finding that the efficiencies claimed did
not rebut the FTC’s prima facie case. In Staples, the court expressly
rejected an effort by the FTC to impose on parties a higher standard of
proof in litigation than the Guidelines impose for agency review of
mergers. The court refused to apply the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard the FTC advocated, observing that imposing such a heightened
standard “would saddle section 7 defendants with the nearly impossible
task of rebutting a possibility with a certainty.”140 In each case, the court
nevertheless found that the claimed efficiencies were badly overstated,
that they had not been shown to be merger specific, and that the parties
had also exaggerated the extent to which they would be passed on
to consumers.
This review of the case law shows that the Merger Guidelines have
been influential in shaping the courts’ approach to efficiencies, just as
they have been in other areas. The courts have followed the agencies’
lead in accepting that efficiencies may be used, in appropriate circum-
stances, to rebut a prima facie case of illegality based on presumptions
drawn from market shares and concentration ratios. The courts have
also adopted the same basic analytical framework as the Guidelines,
sometimes citing the Guidelines, but also often relying on the Areeda-
Turner treatise, on which the current Guidelines approach is largely
modeled.
135 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
136 Id. at 680.
137 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
138 FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
139 FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000).
140 970 F. Supp. at 1089.
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XI. INFLUENCE ON OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In his 1992 article, Robert Pitofsky argued that “[i]n resisting incorpo-
ration of an efficiencies defense into merger enforcement, the United
States is remarkably out of step with the law of other industrialized
countries.”141 The foregoing history of the treatment of efficiencies
reveals that this statement badly mischaracterized the state of agency
policy and practice, even as of 1992. It also ignores the important role
the Merger Guidelines—and the intellectual debate about the ideas in
the Guidelines—have played in shaping competition policy outside the
United States. Numerous jurisdictions outside the United States have
followed the U.S. Merger Guidelines and recognized an efficiencies
defense. Some countries have adopted approaches that are very close to
that set forth in the Guidelines. Included in this group are Argentina,142
Australia,143 Brazil,144 Israel,145 New Zealand,146 South Africa,147 and Vene-
141 Pitofsky, supra note 84, at 213.
142 Argentina’s Guidelines for the Control of Economic Concentrations provide that an
otherwise prohibited merger may be approved if the efficiencies are great enough that
the net impact on the general economic interest is beneficial. Only merger-specific effi-
ciencies may be considered. Resolution No. 726 of the Secretariat of Industry, Commerce
and Mining, issued Aug. 25, 1999. See Javier Petrantonino & Marcelo den Toom, Argentina,
in International Mergers: The Antitrust Process 2-1, 2-4, 2-23 to 2-24. ( J. William
Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2001).
143 Australia’s Merger Guidelines note that “efficiency enhancing aspects of a merger
may impact on the competitiveness of markets” and that such impact is relevant to whether
there is a substantial lessening of competition. Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, Merger Guidelines §§ 5.171–5.174, at § 5.171 (1999). The emphasis is on
efficiencies that “are likely to result in lower (or not significantly higher) prices, increased
output and/or higher quality goods or services.” Separately, efficiencies that do not affect
the competitiveness of the market, but that are of “public benefit,” may be considered in
a determination whether to authorize an otherwise prohibited merger. Id. § 5.16,
§§ 6.39–6.49.
144 Brazil’s Merger Guidelines employ an analytical approach similar to that of the United
States, including an explicit step for consideration of efficiencies. See Francisco R. Todorov,
Advisory Agencies Issue Joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in Baker & McKenzie, Brazil
E-Alert (Aug. 31, 2000) (fourth step is “analysis of efficiencies of the transaction”).
145 In Israel, mergers are evaluated by a competitive effects standard, and efficiencies
are considered in favor of approval of the merger. Lionel Kestenbaum, Israel, in Interna-
tional Mergers: The Antitrust Process 29-1, 29-4 ( J. William Rowley & Donald I.
Baker eds., 2001).
146 In New Zealand, an otherwise prohibited merger may be authorized, pursuant to the
Commerce Act 1986, if the merger will result in a public benefit that justifies approval.
“Increased efficiency is the main public interest justification.” Bernard Matthew Hill, New
Zealand, in International Mergers: The Antitrust Process 45-1, 45-3 to 45-4, 45-7
( J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2001).
147 In South Africa, mergers are evaluated by whether they substantially prevent or lessen
competition, but a merger that is likely to do so must also be evaluated to determine
“whether the merger is likely to result in any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain which will be greater than and offset the effects of any prevention or
lessening of competition.” To qualify, the efficiencies must be of a type that “would not
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zuela.148 Others have adopted approaches that differ from the U.S. articu-
lation but follow the underlying U.S. concepts. For example, in Mexico,
the 1998 Implementing Regulations of the competition law specify that
an “assessment of efficiency gains in the relevant market” must be consid-
ered in evaluating a merger.149 To be considered, the gains must be the
result of the merger and must be proved by the merging parties.150
Particular efficiencies are specified in the Implementing Regulations,
primarily efficiencies that result in lower production costs, although also
including reduction of administrative expenses.151
In Norway, the stated purpose of the competition law is “to achieve
an efficient utilization of society’s resources by providing the necessary
conditions for effective competition.”152 Mergers may be blocked if they
create or strengthen a significant restriction on competition contrary to
the purpose of the competition law.153 The third step of a three-part
analytical process is an evaluation of whether the acquisition would
generate cost savings for society that more than offset efficiency losses
due to restricted competition. The cost savings must be merger-specific;
moreover, income transfers and tax savings are not considered social
cost savings. The Norway Competition Authority emphasizes that if the
anticompetitive effects of an acquisition are large, then documented
efficiency gains need to be considerable.154
Canada has deliberately chosen to adopt an approach that it perceives
as more favorable to efficiencies than the U.S. approach. A recent merger
illustrates the differences. The Canadian Competition Tribunal approved
a propane merger on grounds that the efficiencies, using what it termed a
likely be obtained if the merger is prevented.” Ed Southey & Anthony Norton, South Africa,
in International Mergers: The Antitrust Process 54-1, 54-7, 54-26 ( J. William Rowley
& Donald I. Baker eds., 2001) (quoting Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 16(1)(a)).
148 In Venezuela, the Guidelines to Evaluate Operations of Economic Concentration
recognize that mergers may have effects both of creating market power and generating
efficiency, and provide for evaluation of whether the efficiencies “contribut[e] to obtaining
major economic efficiencies from a social point of view.” The agency seeks verification
of the efficiencies, determination of whether they are merger-specific, and demonstration
of the extent to which they will benefit consumers. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar & Ignacio De
Leon, Venezuela, in International Mergers: The Antitrust Process 67-1, 67-58
( J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2001) (quoting Guidelines to Evaluate Opera-
tions of Economic Concentration, § VI, Efficiencies Generated by the Operation).
149 Gabriel Castan˜eda Allardo, Mexico, in International Mergers: The Antitrust
Process 42-1, 42-3, 42-9, 42-34 to 42-35 ( J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2001).
150 Id. at 42-35.
151 Id. at 42-7, 42-32/12 (Article 6 of Implementing Regulations).
152 Jan Petter Romsaas et al., Norway, in International Mergers: The Antitrust
Process 46-1, 46-3 to 46-4, 46-21 ( J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2001).
153 Id. at 46-3.
154 Id. at 46-29.
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“total surplus” approach, were greater than and offset the anticompetitive
effect.155 The Federal Court of Appeals reversed, citing and discussing
the U.S. approach to efficiencies analysis.156 On remand, the Tribunal
disagreed with the court’s interpretation and took issue with the Court
for following too closely the U.S. approach to efficiencies, which the
Tribunal regarded as “hostile” to efficiencies.157 The Tribunal noted that
the Canadian economy is smaller than that of the United States and thus
more concentration in a market might be required before economies of
scale were fully realized, and suggested that among other differences
between the United States and Canada, the Canadian economy histori-
cally has been more open to trade.158 The Tribunal concluded that the
intent of Parliament was that “the consideration of efficiency gains is
not to be tied into the analysis of the competitive effects of the merger”159
and determined that “[t]he explicit efficiency defence in subsection
96(1) of the [1986] Act is clear evidence that Parliament intended not
to follow the American approach to efficiencies.” On reconsideration,
the Tribunal took account of both wealth transfer effects and total surplus
effects and allowed the merger.160
The European Union is the most recent jurisdiction to move toward
integrating efficiencies as a positive factor in its review of mergers under
its Merger Control Regulation (MCR). The MCR adopts what is called
a dominance test for mergers, requiring the European Commission and
courts to prohibit any merger that “creates or strengthens a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be impeded in
the common market or a substantial part of it.”161 The MCR appears,
155 Commissioner v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 Comp. Trib. 16.
156 Commissioner v. Superior Propane, Inc., Fed. Ct. App. (2002) (slip op.). See also
discussion in the Competition Tribunal’s opinion on remand, Commissioner v. Superior
Propane, Inc., Comp. Trib. (2002) (slip op. ¶¶ 113–131).
157 Commissioner v. Superior Propane, Inc., Comp. Trib. (2002) (slip op. ¶¶ 115–131,
129) (“The Tribunal concludes that in the United States, there is virtually no efficiency
defense to an anticompetitive merger.”). In fact, as the discussion of the 1997 Revisions
shows, the U.S. approach does not foreclose consideration of efficiencies that are not
immediately passed on to consumers to nearly the extent the Tribunal believed.
158 Commissioner v. Superior Propane, Inc., Comp. Trib. (2002) (slip op. ¶¶ 131–149).
See Margaret Sanderson, Efficiency Analysis in Canadian Merger Cases, 65 Antitrust L.J. 623
(1997) (“The need for an emphasis on efficiency is all the more important in a small
economy, such as Canada’s. Concentration levels are high in many Canadian industries,
yet firms may not be operating at minimum efficient scale. In addition, regulatory con-
straints and/or trade barriers may have led to higher costs of production.”).
159 Commissioner v. Superior Propane, Inc., Fed. Ct. App. (2002) (slip op. ¶ 137).
160 Id. ¶¶ 370–377.
161 Council Regulation 4046/89, O.J. (L 395) 1 (Dec. 30, 1989), corrected version O.J.
(L 257) 14 (Sept. 21, 1990), amended, Council Regulation 1310/97, O.J. (L 180) 1 ( July
9, 1997, corrected version O.J. (L 40) 17 (Feb. 13, 1998), effective Mar. 1, 1998, art. 2(3).
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on its face, to require the Commission to take into account efficiencies
as a positive factor in making this determination: “In making this
appraisal, the Commission shall take into account . . . the development
of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers’
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.”162
In practice, when the Commission has considered efficiencies in its
decisions, it, like the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s, has treated
them more as an offense than as a defense.163 In its very first decision
prohibiting a merger under the MCR, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland,164
the Commission found that while the merger would produce some effi-
ciencies in the form of cost savings and expanded opportunities for one-
stop shopping, those efficiencies would only serve to enhance the merged
firm’s power to behave independently of its competitors. And as recently
as last year in its decision prohibiting the GE/Honeywell merger,165 the
Commission based its conclusion that the merger would strengthen GE’s
dominant position in the market for aircraft engines for large commercial
aircraft in part on a finding that the merger would give GE an incentive
to offer customers lower prices for jet engines by causing it to internalize
the externalities associated with charging high prices on complementary
products. While acknowledging that these lower prices would have bene-
fited customers in the short term (thereby enhancing allocative effi-
ciency), the Commission found that these benefits were outweighed by
the risk that GE’s rivals would be forced eventually to exit the market
if they could not match GE’s lower prices.
Partly in response to criticisms of its decision on GE/Honeywell, the
Commission has indicated that it is rethinking its view of efficiencies
and that it intends to view efficiencies more favorably in the future.
Commissioner Monti gave the first sign of this shift in attitude, stating,
“We are not against mergers that create more efficient firms. Such merg-
ers tend to benefit consumers, even if competitors might suffer from
increased competition.”166 The director of the EU Merger Task Force,
Goetz Drauz, built on these remarks at the ABA Section of Antitrust
162 Id. art. 2(1)(b).
163 Christopher Jones & F. Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz, The Ecc Merger Regulation
193–94 (Colin Overbury ed., 1992); Frederic Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as an
Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack?, 1992 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 591 (Barry Hawk
ed., 1993).
164 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Case IV/M53, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.
165 Commission decision of 03/07/2001 declaring concentration to be incompatible
with the common market and the EEA Agreement (General Electric/Honeywell), July 3,
2001, ¶¶ 353, 360, 376.
166 See Mario Monti, Address Before the Future for Competition Policy in the European
Union, Merchant Taylor Hall, London ( July 9, 2001).
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Law’s Spring Meeting in April 2002. He announced that the Commission
was developing merger guidelines that would have a section on efficienc-
ies. Drauz invited merging parties to tell the Task Force about the effi-
ciencies they expect to realize from their transactions, assuring them
that efficiencies would not be used as a reason to challenge a merger
but would be viewed as a favorable factor in the Commission’s competitive
effects analysis. The Commission’s Draft Notice on the Appraisal of
Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, which it released in December
2002, includes a section on efficiencies that adopts a framework very
similar to the 1997 Revisions to the U.S. Merger Guidelines.167
Furthermore, to the extent that the Merger Guidelines’ treatment of
efficiencies, as well as the debates surrounding it, has any persuasive
influence on EU law and practice, that influence will be retransmitted
into transition economies that are adopting or invigorating competition
law regimes for the first time, because they often follow the EU analytical
framework for merger control.168 This is particularly true in Central
and Eastern Europe, where countries have closely followed EU law and
practice in order to harmonize their regimes with the EU and thus ease
their entry into the EU.169
XII. CONCLUSION
As this brief history illustrates, the U.S. courts and antitrust agencies
have made substantial progress since the 1982 Baxter Merger Guidelines
in learning how to integrate efficiencies into their evaluation of poten-
tially anticompetitive mergers. Just as Oliver Williamson predicted in
1968, the courts and agencies have been able to refine the tools they
use to review efficiency claims and have become more comfortable with
their ability to balance any likely efficiencies against any potential
increase in market power as they have gained experience evaluating
167 Draft Commission Notice on the Appraisal of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, O.J. (C 331) 18 (Dec.
31, 2002), ¶¶ 87–95. Like the U.S. Merger Guidelines, the Draft Notice treats efficiencies as
a positive consideration to be integrated into the overall competitive effects analysis. In
particular, the Draft Notice recognizes that efficiencies may “enhance the incentive of the
merged entity to act pro-competitively for the benefit of consumers, by counteracting the
effects on competition which the merger might otherwise have.” Id. ¶ 88. Further, the
Draft Notice focuses on many of the same factors as are considered under the U.S. Merger
Guidelines, such as whether the efficiencies are verifiable, merger-specific, and of direct
benefit to consumers.
168 William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions
in Emerging Economies, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1075, 1089 (1998).
169 Id. at 1087.
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efficiencies. The success of the United States in integrating efficiencies
into merger review has had a significant influence in persuading other
jurisdictions to do likewise. This trend is now extending to Europe, where
the European Commission has indicated that it is developing merger
guidelines that will integrate efficiencies into its competitive effects analy-
sis. The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the subsequent revisions to them
have contributed importantly to this movement toward more rational
antitrust enforcement and will continue to do so.
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APPENDIX
A TAXONOMY OF EFFICIENCIES
Mergers can enable firms to secure a number of distinct types of
efficiencies. The principal categories of efficiencies are: allocative, pro-
ductive, dynamic, and transactional. This Appendix describes and distin-
guishes these four efficiencies and explains why there often is a close
interconnection between them in antitrust analysis.
I. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
At the most general level, a market is said to achieve “allocative effi-
ciency” when market processes lead society’s resources to be allocated
to their highest valued use among all competing uses. In the context of
exchanges between consumers and producer, the value of a product in
the hands of consumers is equalized “at the margin” to the value of the
resources that were used to produce that product. This intuitive condi-
tion ensures that an economy maximizes the aggregate value of all of
its resources by placing them in their highest valued uses.
Antitrust policy looks to the process of market competition as its
principal means for promoting an efficient allocation of society’s scarce
resources. Economic theory formalizes this principle in the First Theo-
rem of Welfare Economics, which identifies a set of very general condi-
tions under which a competitive market process will guarantee the
efficient allocation of resources. In the long run competitive equilibrium,
the market price is just equal to firms’ incremental or marginal cost.
Marginal cost reflects not only directly observable costs of production,
distribution and marketing but also the relevant opportunities forgone
when a resource is used for one purpose rather than for some other
purpose. (Hence, the term “opportunity costs” used by economists.)
From society’s perspective, it represents the total cost of the resources
consumed in producing, distributing, and marketing an additional unit
of a particular commodity rather than employing those resources in
their next best alternative use. Thus, when output is expanded to the
point where price is just equal to marginal cost, the marginal value that
consumers place on a good—which is the amount that they are willing
to pay for the good—is just equal to the marginal value of the resources
242
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used in the good’s production. In the long run equilibrium, monopoly
fails to achieve this allocative efficiency criterion. This follows from the
fact that the monopolist’s price exceeds long-run marginal cost. From
society’s point of view, the marginal value placed on the good produced
by the monopolist is greater than the marginal value of the resources
used in the good’s production. Society, therefore, could be made better
off if the monopolist deployed additional resources to expand output
up to the point where price and marginal cost were equalized. Antitrust
policy embodies this general principle by favoring competition over
monopoly and (more) perfect competition over imperfect (or oligop-
oly) competition.
One way that a merger can promote allocative efficiency arises in the
context of a vertical merger to address the “double markup problem.”
If a manufacturer and a distributor both enjoy some degree of market
power, each firm will find it profit-maximizing to add a monopoly markup
to the price that it charges. As a result, consumers will face a double
markup. Understanding that it has some influence over price, the manu-
facturer will set a wholesale price that equates its marginal revenue to
its marginal cost. Because the manufacturer faces a less than perfectly
elastic demand, the wholesale price that it sets will exceed its marginal
cost of production. Downstream, the distributor will treat the wholesale
price as its relevant marginal cost of business. Also enjoying market
power, the distributor will set a retail price above its marginal cost. Note,
however, that the distortion caused by the second markup is compounded
because it is applied to an already supracompetitive wholesale price.
Contrast this with the case of an integrated manufacturer-distributor.
The integrated firm will “charge itself” only the actual marginal cost of
producing the good and will extract its market power only at the stage
of selling to the final consumer. Consumers facing the double markup
will buy less than when there is an integrated manufacturer-distributor.
As a result, they are worse off.
Collectively, the manufacturer and wholesaler also earn less profit
than they would if they were integrated. This forgone profit provides a
strong incentive for the firms to merge to promote allocative efficiency
and thereby increase their joint profits. If the integrated firm produces
as efficiently as the separate firms, then integration makes both producers
and consumers better off. Even if the integrated firm is somewhat less
efficient than its constituent parts, the desirable effect of eliminating
one of the markups may outweigh this negative effect.170
170 Where a merger is impractical, a variety of vertical contracts may offer alternative
means to mitigate allocative inefficiencies from the double markup. Vertical contracts can
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II. PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
Productive efficiency exists when all goods are produced at the mini-
mum possible total cost so that there is no possible rearrangement or
alternative organization of resources (such as labor, raw materials, and
machinery) that could increase the output of one product without neces-
sarily forcing a reduction in output for at least one other product. This
concept highlights the principle that firms’ choices involve explicit trade-
offs between competing demands for scarce resources.
Mergers (as well as joint ventures and other cooperative practices)
hold the potential to increase productive efficiency in a number of ways,
including by fostering economies of scale, economies of scope, and
synergies. The first way that mergers can increase productive efficiency
is to move firms closer to the optimal scale of production for their
industry. George Stigler developed a simple and economically intuitive
method of ascertaining the optimal scale for a firm, which he coined
the “survivor principle.”171 Stigler’s survivor principle is based on the
intuition that active competition among firms for scare resources—both
within an industry and across industries—inevitably will drive firms
towards the optimal or efficient scale of operations. Under competition,
inefficiently scaled firms will be driven from the market either by exit
or by acquisition. Mergers play a very important role in this competitive
process by reorganizing the ownership and use of economic resources
among firms. Combining the operations of two firms may reduce duplica-
tion; allow fixed expenditures to be spread across a larger base of output;
permit firms to reorganize production lines across plant facilities to
achieve longer production runs and reduce switchover costs; lower inven-
tory holding costs; and enable more specialized uses of resources such
as skilled labor. Each of these merger rationales can facilitate firms’
efforts to reach an efficient scale.
Some economists and antitrust practitioners argue that antitrust agen-
cies should, as a general practice, be skeptical of treating achievement
of economies of scale as a merger-specific efficiency.172 According to this
view, firms generally can reach their efficient scale of production by
be structured by the manufacturer to induce its distributor not to restrict input further
and thereby (at a fixed wholesale price) cut further into the manufacturer’s own margin.
Examples of vertical contracts that can promote this objective are maximum resale price
maintenance, quantity forcing (placing a minimum sales quota on the distributor), and
two-part pricing that sets the wholesale price equal to the manufacturer’s marginal cost
of production and then charges a lump sum franchise fee.
171 George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. Econ. 54 (1968).
172 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis,
68 Antitrust L.J. 685 (2001).
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purchasing additional inputs through market transactions or developing
them internally (if the firm is sub-optimally small) or by shedding surplus
inputs or machinery in secondary markets (if the firm is sub-optimally
large). Because these unilateral changes in firm scale do not necessarily
induce the exit of a direct competitor, they may offer the same gains in
productive efficiency as a merger without the risk of diminished
competition.
There are three practical reasons, however, why internal expansion
(or contraction) can be more costly than a merger.173 First, firms can
often expand their scale faster through a merger than is possible through
internal expansion. Mergers may provide the acquiring firm with ready
access to existing inventories or supply contracts for important inputs
as well as access to additional plant capacity that can quickly be brought
on-line. Second, adding new capacity in a market with static or declining
demand may also place sufficient downward pressure on price to make
internal expansion unprofitable. In this situation, neither of the merging
firms might be likely to expand its scale in the near future absent the
merger. Third, the construction of new capacity may create social waste
if duplicate resources at the acquired firm eventually wind up being
scrapped when they are removed from competition rather than being
merged into a single firm. When any of these conditions is present,
mergers may be a privately or socially less costly means to reap economies
of scale and enhance firms’ productive efficiency.
Mergers can also increase productive efficiency by enabling firms to
exploit economies of scope. Economies of scope, which exist when it is
cheaper to produce two or more products together rather than sepa-
rately,174 can be quite substantial. For example, one study of the econo-
mies of scope achieved by General Motors from combining its production
of large cars with small car and truck production estimated that the firm
saves 25 percent in total operating costs relative to splitting the two
operations.175 There are many potential sources of economies of scope.
One of the most common is the use of common raw inputs. For example,
book publishers exploit economies of scope by producing both hardcover
and soft-cover editions from the same manuscript, and automobile com-
panies exploit economies of scope by producing multiple car models
that use many of the same input components. Technical knowledge
173 Kolasky, supra note 98, at 82–87.
174 John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output Production, 91
Q.J. Econ. 481 (1977).
175 Ann F. Friedlaender, Clifford Winston & Kung Wang, Costs, Technology, and Productivity
in the U.S. Automobile Industry, 14 Bell J. Econ. 1 (1983).
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about producing and selling related products can also contribute to
economies of scope. Information about one product that may be directly
relevant for other closely related products can also contribute to econom-
ics of scope. For example, knowledge about how to market steel bars
efficiently (such as knowing where customers are located and their pur-
chase habits) could assist the firm in marketing steel sheets. Similarly,
knowledge about the techniques to manufacture steel bars efficiently
(such as knowing how to operate blast furnaces and where to obtain a
reliable supply of pig iron) could make the manufacture of steel sheets
more efficient. In these situations, it will tend to be more efficient for
a single firm to produce and market both steel sheets and steel bars.
The principle of economies of scope, by itself, however, does not
necessarily imply that the products should be produced by a single firm.
In theory, economies of scope might be exploited by locating the related
production lines sufficiently close to one another to facilitate exchange
between separate firms. In practice, however, successful exploitation
frequently hinges on achieving transactional efficiencies made possible
by having the related production lines brought under common manage-
ment. Merger is one way to achieve this important nexus between produc-
tive and transactional efficiencies. To make this point more tangible,
consider steel manufacturing as an example. Iron ore is first melted
down into pig iron in a blast furnace; the molten pig iron is then
processed in a steel-making furnace and turned into slabs or sheets of
steel. It is conceivable that two separate firms, side by side, could special-
ize, with one making pig iron and the other making steel, while a pipe
would carry the molten pig iron between the two firms. These firms
would be highly reliant upon one another, however, and the risk that
either firm could exploit or “hold up” the other would introduce substan-
tial transaction inefficiencies.176 High transaction costs frequently explain
firm decisions to bring in-house all of the products for which substantial
economies of scope exist.
Economies of scope flowing from common production or marketing
knowledge offers a second illustration of the relationship between pro-
ductive and transactional efficiencies. In principle, knowledge could be
bought and sold in the market, thus avoiding the necessity to house the
production or marketing of (say) steel bars and steel sheets under the
same corporate roof. In practice, however, market transactions of infor-
mation can be highly costly, inefficient, and subject to opportunism.
176 The classic discussion of this problem is Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford &
Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978).
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Thus, firms often produce closely related products, and a merger may
offer firms an important source of efficiencies they could not easily
otherwise achieve.
A third way by which mergers can increase productive efficiency relates
to synergies. Synergies are defined as cost savings (or quality improve-
ments) that flow from the close or intimate integration of specific, hard-
to-trade assets. Joe Farrell and Carl Shapiro have identified several exam-
ples of synergistic efficiencies.177 One involves efforts to improve inter-
operability between complementary products. Suppose that one firm
produces word processing software that is easy to use but has very limited
graphics capabilities, while another firm produces a desktop publishing
program that is powerful but difficult to use. Many consumers elect to
use the word processor to quickly prepare text files that they then cut
and paste into the desktop publisher for formatting. Differences in the
programs’ file formats and other incompatibilities, however, make this
a second-best solution for consumers. By merging their operations, the
two firms could synergistically improve the interoperability of their prod-
ucts by developing a seamless interface between the text and publishing
software modules. A second source of synergies involves the sharing of
complementary skills. One firm may have developed and perfected a
superior approach to manufacturing a product while a rival may have
built an extensive and well-organized distribution network. Some form of
cooperation—whether a merger, joint venture, or licensing agreement—
could allow the two firms to synergistically integrate their respective
manufacturing and distribution skills to produce and sell their product
more cheaply.
III. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
Dynamic efficiency arises from market processes that encourage inno-
vation to lower costs and develop new and improved products. Whereas
allocative and productive efficiency can be viewed as static criteria—
holding society’s technological know-how constant—a more dynamic
view of efficiency examines the conditions under which technological
know-how and the set of feasible products optimally can be expanded
over time through means such as learning by doing, research and devel-
opment, and entrepreneurial creativity. The dynamic efficiency princi-
ple, most closely associated with Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter,
suggests that the short-run costs associated with allocative and productive
inefficiencies stemming from market power can more than be offset
177 Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 172.
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by benefits from encouraging dynamic efficiencies through “creative
destruction.”178
Schumpeter disputed the traditional view that perfect competition
spurs invention while monopoly retards it. Schumpeter stressed the
advantages enjoyed by larger firms to finance substantial research and
development activities and to appropriate the benefits from their invest-
ment and learning across a larger scale of operations. At the same time,
Schumpeter did not think that the comparative advantage of large firms
in innovation would provide them with a secure or impregnable position
in the market. Schumpeter believed that innovation was a continuous
process and that no single firm would gain more than a transitory monop-
oly from invention in the face of a constant supply of new ideas and
innovations from its other large rivals. This continual competition would
prevent markets from departing too far from the benchmarks of short-
run allocative and productive efficiency, while the pursuit of temporary
monopoly positions would encourage firms to expand technological
frontiers and push out new product boundaries that would allow soci-
ety to achieve in the long run still greater allocative and productive
efficiencies.
Embracing a Schumpeterian view of competition, economists Gary
Roberts and Steve Salop have argued in favor of applying a dynamic
framework for assessing claimed merger efficiencies.179 According to
Roberts and Salop, mergers can accelerate “the pace of technical progress
and reduce prices by facilitating innovations that initiate technological
diffusion and induce competitive innovations.”180 Roberts and Salop have
elaborated on the link between dynamic efficiency and competition:
The dynamic framework provides a far more realistic account of the
manner in which merger efficiencies increase competition. In particu-
lar, the dynamic framework recognizes that cost savings achieved by a
newly merged entity generally will diffuse at least partially to competing
firms over time. As this diffusion occurs, the aggregate cost savings
multiply. The diffusion also should enhance competition and increase
the likelihood that firms will improve consumer welfare by passing the
cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower prices.181
Like allocative and productive efficiencies, achievement of dynamic
efficiencies can be facilitated by antitrust and other public policies that
178 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950).
179 Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 19 Offprints
World Competition L. & Econ. Rev. 5 (1996).
180 Id. at 7–8.
181 Id. at 7.
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permit efficient transactions in support of invention. To illustrate,
dynamic efficiencies require the establishment of an incentive system to
allow inventors to appropriate returns sufficient to make the inventive
activity worthwhile. Establishing and protecting ownership rights to the
fruits of inventive activity is thus essential. Harold Demsetz has pointed
out that “the problem of defining ownership is precisely that of creating
properly scaled legal barriers to entry.”182 Patent protection provides one
type of scaled barrier that balances the appropriability of inventions to
generate necessary returns to firms against the speed of diffusion of the
benefits that consumers derive from invention. Likewise, antitrust policy
seeks to determine appropriately scaled entry barriers, for example, by
governing the conditions under which inventors can use non-compete
provisions to restrain licensees from competing against them, or by
assessing the circumstances under which research joint ventures that
restrict competition among actual or potential rivals may be necessary
to generate dynamic efficiencies.
IV. TRANSACTIONAL EFFICIENCY
The fourth and final category of efficiencies, transactional efficiencies,
is the broadest category. The basic insight offered by the school of
thought known as “transaction cost economics” is that market partici-
pants design business practices, contracts, and organizational forms to
minimize transaction costs and, in particular, to mitigate information
costs and reduce their exposure to opportunistic behavior or “hold-
ups.”183 As alluded to earlier, transactional efficiencies frequently facili-
tate firms’ efforts to achieve allocative, productive, and dynamic
efficiencies.
Oliver Williamson has argued that the critical dimensions of transac-
tions are uncertainty, the frequency of recurrence, and the extent to
which participants in market exchange make investments in transaction-
specific assets.184 Many business relationships require that one or both
parties invest in an asset that is highly specialized to their transaction.
An example of a transaction-specific investment would be the construc-
tion of a pipeline connecting an oil refinery to an isolated distribution
terminal. Because the value of the asset is much higher in its intended
182 Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47, 49 (1982).
183 For a recent application of transaction cost principles to antitrust rules and analysis,
see Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L., Econ.,
& Org. 95 (2002). A helpful exposition of the meanings and sources of transaction costs
appears in Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 Res. in L. & Econ. 1 (1991).
184 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J.L. & Econ. 223 (1979).
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use than in its next best alternative use, the parties are locked into their
relationship to a significant degree. Neither buyers nor sellers can turn
to alternative partners without incurring a substantial loss. By the same
token, however, each party can take advantage of the other by attempting
to obtain more favorable terms than had initially been bargained. Buyers
can refuse to purchase unless the price is reduced, while sellers can
refuse to deliver unless the price is increased. As a result, the value of
the specialized asset over and above its next best alternative use can be
appropriated by opportunistic behavior or hold-ups executed by one or
both parties to the transaction.
The frequency with which transactions recur also guides the selection
of institutional arrangements for governing interactions between market
participants. When transactions take place only infrequently, explicit
contracts or close integration between companies usually will be unneces-
sary except in the presence of highly specialized assets. If transacting
parties expect that they will maintain a continuing relationship, however,
they may rely on implicit or explicit mechanisms such as long-term
contracts, performance bonds, and reputational sanctions to protect
their returns from investments made in physical or human capital special-
ized to their transaction.
Finally, uncertainty or incomplete information about how the value
of resources in their alternative uses may change over time affects how
transactions can be efficiently structured. Information is incomplete for
the simple reason that it is not costless to generate and communicate.
Rational consumers and producers will invest in becoming informed
only up until the point where the marginal cost of information equals
its marginal value. Because the marginal cost remains positive, it follows
that the marginal benefit of information also is positive and hence
rational economic actors remain incompletely informed. A corollary of
this principle is that, in general, it will not pay market participants
to fully insure themselves against risk by designing a complete set of
contingent contracts. Instead, market participants will often rely on other
methods, such as those mentioned earlier, including reputation, repeat
dealing, structured incentives, performance bonds, and third-party
(court) oversight in order to protect their specific investments.
Given uncertainty, the existence of transaction-specific investments,
and varying frequencies of market interactions, parties will design con-
tracts, create joint ventures, or propose mergers to minimize these trans-
actions costs for any given level of economic activity. The pursuit of
transactional efficiency explains why firms choose to consolidate some
activities under common management and direction while leaving other
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activities to market-based transactions. Applying the concept of allocative
efficiency to transactions, economic Nobel laureate Ronald Coase offered
an early theory of merger activity when he wrote that “a firm will tend
to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the
firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by
means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising
another firm.”185 Coase’s simple yet powerful insight helps us understand
why, as mentioned earlier, we frequently observe goods whose production
exhibits economies of scope being produced by a merged firm rather
than having firms attempt to capture scope economies through market
transactions. The risk of opportunistic behavior in this setting raises the
cost of market transactions relative to within-firm organization.
Transactional efficiency also helps explain a variety of other business
practices and market structures. For example, firms that wish to cooper-
ate on research projects may choose to form a joint venture or merger
rather than rely on arm’s-length transactions. Joint ventures and com-
mon ownership can help align firms’ incentives and discourage shirking,
free riding, and opportunistic behavior that can be very costly and diffi-
cult to police using arm’s-length transactions. The pursuit of transac-
tional efficiency also can help explain why firms may adopt various
vertical contracts, such as exclusive territories and resale price mainte-
nance, to help mitigate free riding and principal-agent costs.186 Lastly,
the concept of transactional efficiency has been applied to analyze the
market for corporate control in which the threat of hostile takeovers
can lessen shareholders’ costs of transacting with professional managers
to ensure that they act in the interest of the company’s shareholders.187
185 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 395 (Nov. 1937).
186 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1988); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, An
Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 Rand J. Econ. 27 (1984).
187 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & Econ. 327 (1983).
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